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TRANSFERRING HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE FROM AVIATION TO 
DEVELOPMENT OF A WARNING SYSTEM FOR LANDSLIDE  
 
Ioana Koglbauer, Brightline Avionics, Kalsdorf, Austria 
Guenter Hohenberger, National Alarm- and Warning Center, Styria, Austria 
Christian Steger, Institute of Technical Informatics, University of Technology, Graz, Austria 
 
There is a successful history of transferring knowledge from aviation to other 
domains such as medicine (Thomas & Helmreich, 2002). In this study the ICAO 
multistage alerting service (2008) served as model for the specification of an early 
warning system for landslide. The early warning system is designed to monitor 
mass-movement data provided by GPS sensors, and to generate warnings and 
alarms to the National Alarm- and Warning Center of Styria, Austria. For the 
human factors specification of the new system a qualitative analysis was 
performed. Results are discussed with regard to applicability of human factors 
guidelines from aviation to development of systems for regional alarming centers 
which initiate and supervise disaster management activities.  
 
The change in earth climate leads to an increasing number of torrential rain events and 
the consequence of mass-movement events with different dimensions. As Austria is located 
within the inner Alpine regions its infrastructure and population are exposed to a certain danger. 
By now there is no adequate early-warning-system for such mass-movement events available in 
Austria. As Lettieri, Masella and Radaelli (2009) remarked in a review of international disaster 
management studies, the use of technologies based on satellites, ground sensors and specific 
decision support systems have been too less investigated until now. In the Projekt GeoWSN a 
real-time monitoring system with “Wireless-Sensor-Network” with GPS positioning technique is 
being investigated. 
The multistage alerting service for search and rescue described by ICAO (2008) and 
implemented by member states was used as model for the specification of three warning stages 
for landslide. Originally, ICAO defines the uncertainty (INCERFA), alert (ALERFA) and 
distress (DETRESFA) phases, and specifies activation criteria for each phase and corresponding 
action plans.  
Furthermore, human factors issues for the human machine interface were identified based 
on aviation human factors design standards published by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(Ahlstrom & Longo, 2003) and reviews of disaster management literature (Collins & Kapuku, 
2008; Lettieri et al., 2009; Simpson, 2008; Uniyal, 2008; Kapucu, Arslan & Demiroz, 2010).  
 
Method 
 
For the human factors specification of the new system a qualitative analysis was 
performed with participation of thirteen members of the development team, including authorized 
rescue agents, experts in geology, navigation, informatics, communication technology and 
psychosocial crisis intervention.  
A questionnaire structure was elaborated based on following sources: 
• Applicable disaster management regulations and guidelines,  
• A review of functionality requirements for technical systems (Bayrak, 2009), 
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• Organizational issues involved in disaster monitoring and management (Kapucu, Arslan 
& Demiroz, 2010; Collins & Kapuku, 2008; Jaques, 2010), 
• Usability of the system (Chin, Diehl & Norman, 1988),  
• Alarm thresholds with respect to the balance between missed and false alarms 
(Parasuraman, Hancock & Olofinboba, 1997), and procedures for false alarms. 
 
Results 
 
Alerting Phases  
 
The multistage alerting service described by ICAO (2008) was used as model for the 
specification of three warning stages for landslide. The warning system for landslide should be 
implemented in alpine areas where there is a risk of creeping slopes over a longer period of time. 
In this case expert observers cannot be assigned for a long term to monitor the area, and the 
experience showed that the assignment of non-expert observers often leads to false alarms and 
waste of valuable time and resources. Thus, the new GPS-based system shall be implemented to 
provide objective data which are processed by the system according to a set of area-specific 
thresholds which are set by geology experts. 
Similarly to the ICAO (2008) alerting service, in our study three warning phases were 
defined, including triggers and action plans. Of course, our triggers and action plans were 
specific for landslide. In the first phase there is monitoring, but unlike in aviation, this phase can 
last for a long period of time if the acceleration of the mass-movement does not exceed a 
specified threshold. In the second warning phase the mass-movement reached 90% of the 
threshold value and expert observers are sent to observe the area. The concerned emergency 
organizations and population are informed to expect landslide and access in the danger area is 
restricted. In the third phase of alarming, there is an acute danger of landslide and the population 
and emergency organizations are alarmed to activate their previously specified action plans. 
 
Interface Design  
 
This section addresses the application of human factors system design standards from 
aviation published by FAA (Ahlstrom & Longo, 2003) to disaster monitoring and alarming 
systems.  
A closer look at working conditions of the agents in the alarming center showed that, the 
same as pilots and air traffic controllers, they monitor a large amount of systems in a dynamic, 
distributed and real-time environment. However, their systems did not reach the level of 
standardization we face in the aerospace branch. Especially displays for warning systems are 
provided by a multitude of sources with various design philosophies (Figure 1).  
The agents have short response times and are expected within minutes to identify dangers 
and warnings, and to deploy the respective action plans. It is obvious that the display design for 
disaster monitoring, same as aircraft cockpit design influences the performance of the operator 
(Trollip & Jensen, 1991). Thus, we found that early warning, anticipatory cues and multiple 
coding of display indications, and multimodality of warning and alarms were key human factors 
requirements.  
 The use of colors for coding the warning phases was similar to the aviation standard: red 
for alarm, yellow for caution, green when no danger is detected by the system. The freedom in 
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Europe with respect to color coding of disaster warning can be seen in some other systems which 
use purple for the highest alarm phase. 
 
Figure 1. “Cockpit” of the authorized agents in 
the alarming center of Styria. Various warning 
systems are displayed on different monitors.  
Figure 2. A model of the graphic 
interface of the early-warning system 
for landslide. The display shows multiple 
coding of the system status. 
 
Another example illustrated in Figure 2 is the multiple coding of system status indications 
which use both colors (green and red) and symbols (e.g. x for missing data flags).  
 
Figure 3. A model of the graphic interface 
of the early-warning system for landslide. 
The display shows multiple coding of the 
warning phase. 
Figure 4. The same model of the graphic 
interface in gray. 
 
 Furthermore, for displaying the warning phase we selected an indication similar to 
aircraft engine instruments (Figure 3), which indicates the actual warning phase and also allows 
anticipation. In this case the position of the arrow shows that the system currently does not detect 
any danger, but the arrow is near the threshold to the second warning phase indicating that a 
change might occur. Another benefit of this kind of indication is that it intuitively shows the 
degree of danger from low to high and it can be well interpreted independent of the color (Figure 
4).  
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One reason for multiple coding is that although color coding has the benefit to speed up 
decoding of an indication (see Ahlstrom & Longo, 2003), there might be operators with color 
blindness who cannot rely on color codes alone. This issue is not so uncommon even among 
recreational pilots, but it is seldom considered by designers.  
Furthermore, for warning and alarms a multimodal procedure was developed using 
besides visual display indications also aural cues, triggered by the communication equipment of 
the agents (e.g. SMS, Alarm-App). 
Usability criteria of the human-machine-interface (HMI) of the warning system were 
specified in terms of functions, terminology and information, display modality, user concept and 
error tolerance which are not described here more detailed. 
However, there were more human factors issues to be considered in developing the 
human machine interface of the system which required inputs from different experts who 
participated to the development: system functionality requirements and organizational issues. 
These are rather typical disaster management issues. 
 
System functionality requirements 
 
This section addresses system functionality requirements or what the agents should expect from 
the system in terms of accuracy, availability, redundancy, reliability, maintainability (Bayrak, 
2009). For example accuracy of sensors was set at the range of 10 cm and data transmission 
failures of 5%. The capability of the system to identify and display data errors, as well as 
procedures for designing an error tolerant system, and abnormal procedures for technical failures 
that cannot be avoided were specified. Availability, derived from the time system is working 
divided by the time when the system exists between failures was set between 95% and 99%. 
Redundancy was specified in terms of redundant software and hardware to compensate 
especially for loss of components. Another critical feature to define was the system reliability, as 
lifetime of components or time to failure of a unit. Furthermore maintainability of the system 
was specified as a measure of the time within the system can be repaired after a failure. 
 
Organizational requirements 
 
This section addresses system features necessary for the organizations involved in warning and 
disaster management. From organizational point of view system performance factors were 
considered the connectivity to and the availability of a commonly accessible pool of information 
using a web interface (e.g. chat-room, messaging, photo-sharing). Furthermore, connectivity with 
another system providing demographical and strategic infrastructure information was considered.   
 
Discussion 
 
Generally results are supportive for the applicability of human factors system design standards 
from aviation to disaster monitoring and alarming systems. However, this should not be seen as 
an over-generalization. Disaster management is a growing research field with specific domains, 
actors and regulations. Besides the scientific approach, other factors and interest areas (e.g. 
political, economic, social) play a major role on interpretation, prevention and management of 
disasters.       
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